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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between climate and health is receiving more attention than ever with 
global warming emerging as one of the greatest challenges for humankind in the 21
st 
century. This is evident with human health featuring prominently as one of the 
dimensions to assess the impact-adaptation-vulnerability of climate change in the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 
2007). The concern over human health is rightly justified because although climate 
change could have some positive impacts on health, such as reduction in cold-related 
mortality and morbidity, by and large the effects are negative (Confalonieri et al. 
2007). Even if international action were taken to deal with global warming now, 
climate change would continue for at least a few decades to come (IPCC 2001). 
Furthermore, the global nature of climate change means that it is necessary to develop 
health risk management strategies different from those being used in the past against 
localized environmental health hazards such as air pollution or water contamination 
(McMichael et al. 2008). The climate change backdrop aside, assessing the climate-
health relationship is an important issue on its own. In particular, the returns to health 
expenditure (or health interventions) may differ across climate zones, so knowledge 
of the impact of climate on health can be used to make cross country comparisons of 
health performance and health system efficiency more meaningful.  
 
Previous research on the health effects of climate and climate change has focused 
largely on individual effects such as thermal stress (i.e. heatwave or cold-wave), other 
extreme weather events (e.g. drought, cyclone), and infectious diseases (e.g. malaria, 
cholera), with some extension to crop production and malnutrition (McMichael et al. 
2006; Haines et al. 2006). But there is little research on the social, economic, and   3
demographic disruptions due to climate change and their flow-on effects on health 
(McMichael et al. 2006). Empirical studies on low income countries are even rarer, 
despite the fact that low income countries are at much greater risks than high income 
ones in the face of rapid climate change (Haines et al. 2004, 2006). 
 
Instead of investigating individual climate-sensitive health hazards, the current paper 
examines the effect of climate on mortality using a large cross country dataset. Cross 
country datasets are useful in quantifying the difference in mortality that can be 
attributed to the variation in climatic conditions across countries, and how this effect 
may be modified by various socioeconomic conditions (e.g. Tang, Chin & Rao 2008). 
Examining the climate-health relationship is made challenging by a number of factors. 
Firstly, climate (and geography in general) affects economic development not only 
through its impact on health but also via agricultural production (Sachs 2001; Masters 
and McMillan 2001; Gallup et al. 1999).
1 But things are made more complicated as 
income (along side other positive aspects of development) is also vital in determining 
health status; therefore, the climate-health relationship should not be examined in 
isolation from the income-health relationship as the two effects are likely to overlap.  
Secondly, climate itself is multidimensional, and while a good climate for health may 
also be a good climate for productivity, this need not be the case. For instance, frost 
can help kill pests that damage crops as well as parasites that infect human; whereas 
regular rainfall which is beneficial to crop production can also lead to mosquitoes 
breeding. Previous studies like Sachs (2001) and Masters and McMillan (2001) focus 
largely on the tropical-temperate climate zone division. In contrast, the current study 
                                                 
1 Natural disasters or even regular climatic events can also affect non-agricultural production and other 
economic activities, e.g. heavy rain could cause transportation interruption.   4
measures climate using multidimensional parameters. Thirdly, while climate can 
affect productivity and health, income can in turn provide a buffer against the adverse 
effects of climate on health and production. The last two factors together imply that 
the triangular climate-income-health relationship is dynamic rather than static. An 
innovation of the current study is that it makes use of multiple but related regressions 
to disentangle this complex relationship, and eventually integrates the findings into a 
coherent “climate trap” model of development for countries of vastly different health 
and income levels. 
 
The empirical analysis of this paper is divided into two parts: sections 2 and 3 
respectively. In section 2, we use variation partition method (Borcard 2002) to 
decompose the effects of climate and income on mortality into three components: the 
pure climate effect, the pure income effect, and the overlapping climate-income effect.  
The pure climate effect is defined as the impact on mortality that is associated with 
climate only (i.e. excluding the indirect impact of climate on health via income), the 
pure income as the impact associated with income only, and the overlapping climate-
income effect as the inseparable impact associated with both. The conclusion of this 
section is clear and distinct: the pure climate effect is close to negligible for non-
African countries, whereas the pure income effect is close to negligible for African 
countries. Further investigation as to what gives rise to such a contradiction is the 
focus of section 3.  
 
While it may be tempting to attribute the contradiction between the two groups to 
their differences in climatic and socioeconomic conditions, such a simple explanation 
has missed the key fact that income and climate need not be independent in their   5
impact on health. In section 3, we examine how the interaction between climate and 
income can affect mortality using a number of techniques. The findings from various 
estimations consistently point to the same conclusion: climate impacts on mortality, 
but higher incomes can moderate this effect. This implies that income is more 
important in terms of improving life expectancy for countries with less favourable 
climate for health. These findings leads to the development of a climate trap model in 
section 4. The model provides a unified explanation of the income and mortality gaps 
between countries of different climatic conditions. Lastly, section 5 concludes the 
paper with a further discussion of the implications of our findings in the context of 
climate change. 
 
2. Empirical Result: Part I 
 
2.1 Partitioning the Effects of Climate and Income on Mortality 
 
In this section, we use the variation partition method to decompose the intertwining 
effects of climate and income on mortality. The function of the variation partition 
method is to estimate the fraction of the variation in the explained variable contributed 
by different explanatory variables (Borcard 2002). The national life expectancy at 
birth (LE) for the year 2000 is used as the explained variable. Life expectancy is good 
measure of population mortality because it summarizes the mortality risks of different 
age and sex groups, and has been used widely for health and wellbeing assessment. In 
our content, the variation partition method involves estimating three empirical 
models: 
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where i is a country index; k is a climate variable index; and e, ε and u are error terms. 
 
In model (1), there are nine explanatory variables which capture various aspects of the 
climate for a particular country. They include: mean distance to coast in km 
(DNEW_POP); mean elevation in km (EMEAN_POP); mean standard deviation of 
elevation in grid cell (ESD_POP);
2 roughness of elevation in grid cell 
(ROUGH_POP);
3 a dummy for being landlocked (LANDLOCKED); average 
monthly temperature in Celsius (TEMPAV_POP); standard derivation of temperature 
(TEMPSD_POP); average monthly precipitation in mm (PRECAV_POP); standard 
deviation of monthly precipitation (PRECSD_POP). The first four variables are 
included here because they are relevant to seasonality. Admittedly they could have 
wider biophysical relevance than just climate. But these biophysical factors are also 
important in determining the effect of climate on human health. For instance, 
population that live close to seashore will be more affected by wind storm and change 
in sea level, while those live at high attitude will have less access to health care. The 
data are sourced from GEon 1.3 database (see the Appendix for details). The variables 
are weighted by population distribution within countries with a resolution up to the 
size of a grid cell. This adjustment is essential for countries that have very different 
climates in different territorial regions, especially large countries. In Australia, for 
                                                 
2 One grid cell is of the size one-degree latitude by one-degree longitude, approximately equal to 
100km by 100km. 
3 The difference between roughness and standard deviation of evaluation is that, the former measures 
the “mountainousness” of a grid cell. For details of the estimation method, see Hood (2005).   7
example, most of the population lives in temperate climates near the coastline, large 
inland areas with hostile climate are mostly uninhabited.
4 
 
Model (2) has a single explanatory variable – log income per capita measured in 
purchasing power parity, constant 2000 international dollar terms (LGDP). To 
mitigate the reverse causality from income to mortality, we use the average value of 
income per capita from 1990 to 1999. The average is preferred to a single year value 
as it is less likely to be affected by country specific business cycles. Model (3) 
includes both the nine climate variables and the log income per capita variable as 
explanatory variables. Models (2) and (3) are noticeably parsimonious on non-climate 
determinants with only income per capita included. This is because income per capita 
is a strong proxy for socioeconomic development and is highly correlated with many 
other development indicators. These exclusions also simplify the model so we can 
concentrate on the health effects of climate and income. On the contrary, a large 
number of climate variables are included in the models because the relationships 
between climate and mortality and between climate and income are unlikely to be 
unidimensional.  
 
Table 1 reports the results of three regressions for the full sample of 152 countries. 
Based on the coefficient of multiple determination or simply goodness-of-fit statistic 
                                                 
4 Besides average and standard deviation, the database also provides information on maximum and 
minimum temperature and precipitation. However, the standard deviation and average 
temperature/precipitation explain nearly all of the variation across countries in terms of minimum and 
maximum temperatures/precipitation. Including these variables tends to render the average and 
standard deviation measures insignificant, and adds very little to the model in terms of explanatory 
power.   8
(R
2), even a single explanatory variable LGDP can explain nearly 65% of the 
variation in LE in the full sample; including the climate variables pushes that up to 
80%. It proves that in the content of cross country regression, these parsimonious 
models have high explanatory power.  
 
The R
2 statistics are analysed in order to disentangle the intertwining effects of 
climate and income on mortality, as depicted in the Figure 1. In this Venn diagram, 
the overlapping part represents the indirect effect of climate on mortality via its effect 
on income. This is because the alternative interpretation that a country’s income can 
affect its climate is implausible, at least in the short term. On the contrary, the pure 
climate effect represents the effect of climate on mortality via pathways unrelated to 
income, such as heatwaves or climatic conditions that foster the spread of disease. 
Similarly, the pure income effect represents the income component that is unrelated to 
climate, such as institutional quality or government policies. The R
2 statistic measures 
the variation of the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables; 
therefore the more important climate is in determining mortality, the greater the R
2 of 
the model (1); the same for income per capita in model (2). Thus, the R
2’s of models 
(1), (2), and (3) provide measures of the explanatory power on mortality of the total 
climate effect, the total income effect, and the combined climate and income effect. 
Here we can impute the size of the pure climate effect by subtracting the total income 
effect from the combined effect: 0.800 – 0.639 = 0.161. Similarly, the pure income 
effect can be calculated as 0.800 – 0.651 = 0.150, and the overlapping effect as 0.639 
+ 0.651 – 0.800 = 0.490. In order to measure the relative importance of each factor, 
we normalize the combined effect to 100%, then the pure clime effect, the pure   9
income effect, and the overlapping effect will be roughly equal to 20, 20, and 60% 
respectively. The figures are summarized in Figure 2 (the “All countries” bar). 
 
 
2.2. African and non-African countries 
 
Since in general African countries have harsher climates and worse mortality records 
than the other countries, we separate them out in model 3 using an African dummy.
5 
(Note for reviewers and editors: All the results not reported in the paper will be made 
available to readers on requests and are shown in the Appendix 2.) An F-test shows 
that the terms involving the African dummy are jointly significant (p-value=0.00). 
This suggests that African and non-African countries should be modelled separately. 
Table 1 reports the results for the split samples of 113 non-African countries and 39 
African countries (suffix “NA” denotes the non-African sample and “A” for the 
African one).
6 Although the level of significance for the climate variables for the two 
sub-samples is not as high as that of the full sample, an F-test shows that at least one 
coefficient of the climate variables is significant at the 1% level for the African 
sample (p-value=0.00) and at the 5% level for the non-African sample (p-value=0.02). 
 
The decompositions of the pure climate effect, the pure income effect, and the 
overlapping effect for the two sub-samples are shown in Figure 2. The two sub-
samples give very different results. For African countries, the pure income effect is of 
a negligible size at 3%, while the pure climate effect is much larger at 66%. Non-
                                                 
5 Detail results are not shown to save space. All detail results not reported in the paper can be obtained 
from the authors on request. 
6 We do not further separate sub-Saharan African countries out because that will render the sample size 
to be too small.   10
African countries have a converse result in that the pure climate effect is less than 5% 
but the pure income effect is close to 40%. We can rule out the possibility that this 
contradiction is due to differences in income and climate variations between the two 
samples. This is because, if anything, income variation is larger in the African sample 
and climate variation is larger in the non-African sample (Table A1, Appendix). The 
contradiction between the two groups will be further examined in detail in the next 
section. Nonetheless, we would like to point out upfront that caution must be 
exercised in placing too much emphasis on the quantitative results from the African 
sample. This is because firstly the African sample is rather small; secondly many 
African countries are plagued with HIV/AIDS epidemics; and thirdly mortality data 
for African countries are notoriously poor. Since the non-African sample is of much 
better quality data, in what follows we will use it as the main vehicle to investigate the 
interacting mechanism between climate and income, and we return to the African 
sample later to confirm whether the same mechanism is applicable there. 
 
3. Empirical Results: Part II 
 
3.1. Climate-income interaction 
 
To investigate how climate interacts with income in affecting mortality, we again 
conduct a number of regression analyses. Each of the techniques involved has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, but together they provide a powerful tool to scrutinize 
the robustness of the findings. 
 
In the first analysis, we examine if the impact of climate on mortality changes with 
income level. To this end, for model 3A we split the non-African countries into two 
groups at the median income level at 6000. An F-test for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the climate variables are the same across both samples is rejected (p-  11
value=0.03), indicating that the effect of at least one climate variable on health is 
different for the two income groups. This suggests that income level may play a role 
in shaping the effect of climate on mortality. This effect is not induced by potential 
differences in the effect of income on mortality for each sample as we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the coefficients of LGDP are the same across the two samples (p-
value=0.93). 
 
To further investigate the above hypothesis, in the second analysis we allow LGDP to 
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The results are reported in Table 2 (model 4NA). An F-test shows that at least one of 
the interaction terms affects life expectancy (p-value=0.02). Moreover, without 
exception, the coefficients of each climate variable ( k φ ) and its interaction term ( k σ ) 
are of opposite signs. This strongly suggests that income can moderate the effects of 
climate on mortality. Since income is expressed in logarithmic terms, the moderating 
effect of income diminishes as income goes up.
7 To examine if income moderates the 
effect of each of the nine climate variables to a similar extent, we conduct an F-test 
with the null hypothesis that  11 22 99 / / ... / φ σφ σ φ σ == =. The result shows that we 
                                                 
7 Still, the logarithmic function of income per capita does not fully account for the pace at which the 
moderating effect diminishes. When we include LGDP-squared in the regression, both as a stand alone 
term and as an interaction term with climate variables, each of the LGDP-squared terms is significant 
and of an opposite sign to its corresponding LGDP term. This indicates that the moderating effect of 
income diminishes slower and thus lasts longer before complete depletion than what the logarithmic 
function suggests.   12
cannot reject the null hypothesis (p-value=0.66). This result provides a foundation to 
conduct the third analysis. 
 
In the third analysis, we restrict the moderating factor of income  2 λ  to be the same for 
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The result (model 5NA, Table 2) shows that the coefficient of moderating factor 
(i.e. 2 λ ) is negative and significant (p-value=0.00), suggesting that as income goes up 
the effect of unfavourable climate on mortality declines. However, climatic conditions 
can also impact upon a countries income, so in order to prove that the above result in 
not an artefact of this causal effect of climate on income we conduct the following 
analysis.  
 
In the fourth analysis, we first regress LGDP against the nine climate variables using 
the full sample.
8 The fitted value of LGDP from the regression, LGDP_FITTED, is 
the income component that is related to climate, and the residue of the regression, 
LGDP_RESIDUE, is the income component that is unrelated to climatic conditions. 
In model 6NA, Table 2, we examine if the two components interact with climate in a 
similar way by interacting each of them with the climate variables. It is found that, 
like LGDP, both income components have a negative sign. The size of the coefficient 
of LGDP_RESIDUE is about 2.2 times that of LGDP_FITTED. However, an F-test 
shows that the null hypothesis that the two coefficients to be same can not be rejected 
                                                 
8 The reason why we use full sample here will become clear in section 3.2 (see footnote 12).   13
at the 10% level (p-value=0.14).
9 So, it is safe to conclude that potentially both 
income components can moderate the effect of climate on mortality, and the effect of 
the independent income component is at least as large as that of the one associated 
with climate.  
 
3.2. African countries once again 
 
Do the results in the previous section hold for African countries as well? In principle, 
the analyses could be repeated using the African sample. However, the small number 
of observations of the African sample (39 in total) means that using a large number of 
interaction terms in a regression like model (4), is not practical. Therefore, we only 
estimate the other two models for the African sample and the results are also reported 
in Table 2. Just like in model 5NA, the coefficient of the interaction term in model 5A 
is significant at the 1% level and has a negative sign. When we split the income 
variable into two components in model 6A, both components retains the negative 
signs. Although both LGDP and the interaction term of LGDP_RESIDUE are 
individually insignificant, they are jointly significant at the 5% level (p-value=0.04).
10 
Furthermore, the moderating effect of LGDP_RESIDUE is smaller than that of 
LGDP_FITTED, with the coefficients of the former about one-third the size of the 
later. This is in contrast to the results for the non-African sample.
  
 
                                                 
9 LGDP_FITTED and LGDP_RESIDUE are obtained from a regression using the full sample. If we re-
estimate them using the non-African sample and use the new income components measures in model 
5NA, the results remain largely the same. 
10 Recall that the fitted value and residue are estimated using the full sample. Using those estimated 
from the African sample leads to convergence problem during the estimation process.   14
Overall, some cautious conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, as reflected in the 
signs of coefficients, the mortality of African countries are subject to the forces of 
climate and income in a way not dissimilar to their non-African counterparts. On the 
other hand, as reflected in the magnitude and significance of the coefficients, the 
strength of these forces may not be the same across the two samples. However, further 




The analysis of the African sample is made difficult not only by the small sample size, 
but also the fact that most African countries are of high HIV/AIDS prevalence, as 
compared to an average non-African country. Since in general the climate of African 
countries is quite distinct from that of non-African countries, the very large pure 
climate effect evident in the African sample could be a result of its high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence. 
 
We have experimented with a number of methods to control for HIV/AIDS. The most 
direct method is to include a HIV/AIDS prevalence variable in all the regressions. 
However, the recently renewed HIV/AIDS data compiled by the World Health 
Organization only cover 2005, leading the LE data by five years. Using these data will 
invoke endogeneity problems. This is because HIV transmission is often considered to 
be related to the current level of life expectancy (Mahal 2001), and therefore those 
countries with low life expectancies are more likely to have a high future prevalence 
of HIV/AIDS.  
 
The second method is to separate countries of low and high HIV/AIDS prevalence. In 
Figure 2, we report the decomposition results for countries of HIV/AIDS prevalence   15
of less than and bigger than 1% of the population, respectively. The result for the low 
prevalence sample is similar to that of the non-African sample, while that for the high 
prevalence sample is similar to that of the African sample. This is not surprising as 
African countries dominate the high prevalence sample. Further separating low and 
high prevalence countries amongst African and non-African countries would leave 
each group with too few observations for estimation. 
 
The third method is to use life expectancy data from the 1970s as a robustness check, 
as HIV/AIDS had not yet become an epidemic then. Due to the restriction of data 
availability, we use 1982 data for life expectancy at birth and 1977 data for income. 
The results are also reported in Figure 2. For African countries, the results are very 
similar to those of year 2000. In particular, the size of the pure climate effect is very 
large and that of the pure income effect is very small. This gives us confidence that 
our key findings regarding the mortality effects of climate, income, and their 
interaction, are very robust despite the presence of HIV/AIDS amongst African 
countries. The result for non-African countries will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4. The Climate Trap Model of Development 
 
4.1 Virtuous and vicious cycles 
 
A consistent finding from all the analyses in section 3 is that income can not only 
improve life expectancy directly, but can also effectively moderate the impact of 
climate on mortality. This finding is in line with expectations that countries of higher 
income level can afford putting more resources to alleviate the adverse effects of 
climate on health. The alleviation may range from using air conditioners/heaters 
during summers/winters to using vaccines against tropical diseases, from building 
storm drainage networks against floods to developing water-recycling systems against   16
droughts. On the other hand, income (or economic development in general) affects 
mortality positively via the provision of shelters, health services, education, law and 
order, and infrastructure, and negatively via the pathways of poor diet and lifestyles, 
urbanization, workplace hazards and stress. So it is reasonable to expect that climate 
has limited role to play in this process. The finding helps explain the result in Figure 2 
that the relative size of the pure climate effect for non-African countries is small while 
that of the pure income effect is large. This is because, on the one hand, as the effect 
of climate is largely neutralized by that of income, climate will have little residual 
impact on mortality; on the other hand, as income not only alleviates health conditions 
caused by climatic conditions but also improves health conditions unrelated to climate, 
it has a substantial amount of independent impact on mortality. 
 
The finding that the component of income that is associated with climate can in turn 
moderate the effect of climate on mortality has important implications. Consider two 
continents: F(avourable) and U(nfavourable). Suppose initially the income levels of 
both continents are roughly the same at the subsistence level, but the climate 
condition in continent F is somewhat more favourable for agricultural production than 
that in continent U. For instance, continent F has more frost days that help kill 
parasites (Masters and McMillan 2001). The faster economic growth leads to a higher 
income level in continent F and thus affords it more resources to reduce mortality 
risks, including those related to climate. A higher life expectancy will lower the 
subjective discount rate of non-myopic individuals. Lower subjective discount rate 
will encourage saving and investment in both physical and human capital, which in 
turn will stimulate technological progress and eventually higher income growth. A 
higher income will further alleviate the residual effect of climate on mortality   17
(probably at a diminishing rate). A virtuous cycle is formed. Furthermore, as 
manufacturing and service sectors grow at the expense of the agricultural sector, it 
will further mitigate the effect of climate on development and hence mortality. This 
again explains why in Figure 2 the relative size of the pure climate effect amongst 
non-African countries is so small. 
 
For continent U, the less favourable climate means that its initial economic growth is 
low. Without sufficient resources, it cannot afford to develop technology in order to 
shield its population from the adverse effects of the climate. As long as the mortality 
rate is high, people have little incentive to save and invest. Consequently, income 
level remains low and the continent continues to be vulnerable to the adverse climate. 
A vicious cycle is thus formed. Moreover, since the economy is dominated by 
agricultural production at this development stage, the income level is closely tied to 
climate. Thereby, the relative size of the pure income effect, which is independent of 
climate, is negligibly small. 
 
This climate trap model is further verified with the data of the 1970s. The results in 
section 3.3 show that, from the 1970s to 1990s there is a substantial increase in the 
pure income effect at the expense of the pure climate effect (and to a much less extent 
the overlapping effect) for non-African countries. During the two decades, income per 
capita of non-African countries has increased by 30% on average. The rise in income 
level, according to our model, will further moderate the effect of climate on mortality. 
Therefore, it is logical to see that the size of the pure income effect increases while 
that of the pure climate effect declines. Moreover, as these economies are increasingly 
less vulnerable to climate, the direct effect of climate via the income channel should   18
also reduce, as reflected in the reduction of the climate-income overlapping effect 
over the two periods. For African countries, income levels basically stagnated during 
these two decades (mean value increases by 3% while median value decreases by 4%). 
This indeed is consistent with the vicious cycle scenario that, countries inside a 
climate trap could remain vulnerable to climate for a prolonged period. Admittedly, 
this consistency does not exclude the possibility that other factors such bad policy 
could also attribute to the development sluggishness of these countries.  
 
4.2 A Generalized Climate Trap Model 
 
The African and non-African division is a highly simplified, dichromatic spatial view 
of the world. Climate is not uniformly unfavourable across the African continent, 
neither is it uniformly favourable across non-African countries. Moreover, a climatic 
condition that is favourable for health is not necessary equally favourable for 
(agricultural) production, and vice versa. To further generalize the climate trap model, 
we propose to classify climatic conditions according to whether they are “good”, 
“neutral”, or “bad” for health and for production respectively. This generates a total of 
nine combinations of climatic conditions. Obviously the “good for health and good for 
production” climatic condition is most favourable for development as they have 
positive effects on both human capital and productivity. The virtuous cycle effect will 
be at its full strength in this case. On the opposite, the “bad for health and bad for 
production” climatic conditions is the most development repressing as the vicious 
cycle effect will be the strongest then. The other sets of climatic conditions are 
somewhere in between. Whether a virtuous cycle of prosperity or a vicious cycle of 
poverty will be formed depends on which of the two climate effects dominates. 
   19
To obtain an overall picture of how countries distribute amongst these nine stylized 
climatic conditions, we construct two climate indexes for 177 countries, one for health 
and the other for production.
11 The health/production climate index indicates how 
favourable a country’s climatic condition is as far as health/production is concerned. 
Each index is constructed as a weighted sum of the nine climate variables. The 
weightings are obtained from regressions. The health climate index is constructed 
using the estimated coefficient from model (4) except that it is now estimated using 








Health climate index climate φ
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=∑  (6) 
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where ϖ is an error term, and life expectancy at birth at 1982 (LE1982) is included in 
(7) to control for initial health conditions. 
 
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the two indexes. The solid lines inside the figures 
indicate the mean values of the indexes, and the shade indicates the ± 0.5 standard 
deviation bands around the means. If we denote a climatic condition as “good/bad” 
when the climate index is bigger/smaller than the sample mean by more than half of 
one standard deviation, then we can identify sets of countries outside the shade in 
                                                 
11 We can construct indexes for more than 152 countries because, for instance, once we obtain the 
weights for the health climate index, we can apply them to countries with climate data but without 
income per capita data.   20
Figure 2 as those with climatic conditions that are either good or bad for health and 
production respectively. If the generalized virtuous/vicious cycle theory remains valid, 
we would expect to see countries with climatic conditions that are good for both 
health and production being largely of a high income level, where those with climatic 
conditions that are bad for both being largely of a low income level, and countries 
with mixed climate conditions registering a mixture of income levels.
12 
 
Table 3 reports the countries that fall into the 4 categories of climatic conditions. 
Countries with climate bad for both health and production are all low and lower-
middle income countries with the exception of Chile and Costa Rica.
13 African 
countries make up more than half of the group. On the contrary, countries with 
climate good for both health and production are slightly more diversified, with 
European OECD countries make up about one-third of the group. Many of the 
remaining members of this group are upper-middle or high income countries, with the 
exceptions of Algeria, Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine. The group with climate good 
for production but bad for health has a mixture of countries with both high and low 
incomes. So for the group as a whole, there is no clear evidence which climate 
condition dominates the other. In comparison, the group with climate good for health 
but bad for production are dominated by low and lower-middle income countries, and 
many of them are in the central Asian regions. So it seems to suggest that for this 
                                                 
12 It should be pointed out here that even though regression (7) involves LGDP, it does not imply that 
the constructed production climate index will be highly correlated with LGDP. The correlation between 
LGDP and the production and health climate indexes are respectively equal to 0.53 and 0.36 only. 
13 The index values of both countries, especially Chile, are indeed fairly close to the one standard 
deviation bands around the means. Chile falls in this climate category mainly because it has a high 
elevation and is mountainous.   21
group, the unfavourable climatic conditions for production tend to dominate the 
favourable climatic conditions for health. Overall, the distribution of countries 
amongst the four distinct categories of climate shows support to the generalized 
climate trap model. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Malaria is a constant reminder of the impact climate could have on health and 
development. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), every year more 
than 500 million people become severely ill with malaria, mostly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the disease causes an average loss of 1.3% annual economic growth in 
countries with intense transmission. The disease affects people not only via its direct 
effect on their health, but also indirectly via its effect on their health expenditure, 
ability to work and to learn. And climate change is expected to raise the number of 
people vulnerable to malaria in the region dramatically (McMichael et al. 2008). 
Obviously malaria or infectious diseases in general is not the only pathway through 
which climate impacts upon health; heatwaves, cyclones, floods, and droughts are 
some other commonly mentioned pathways. The growing concerns about global 
warming rightly put the climate-health relationship at the centre in the assessment of 
the impact-adaptation-vulnerability of different regions to climate change. 
 
The current study represents an effort toward a better understanding of the climate-
health relationship in the boarder content of development. The study acknowledges 
that the effect of climate on health is contingent on socioeconomic conditions and 
thereby analyses the climate-health relationship in conjunction with the climate-
income and income-health relationships. The econometric methods developed in this   22
paper allow us to decompose the effects of climate and income on health into three 
components: the pure climate effect, the pure income effect, and the overlapping 
effect. A further investigation of the difference between African and non-African 
countries leads to a conclusion that, while climate can impact on both health and 
income, income in turn can moderate or neutralize the effect of climate on health. All 
these findings precipitate into the “climate trap” model of development. 
 
The findings have important policy implications in relation to climate change. First of 
all, climate change, such as rise in the average temperature and change in rainfall 
pattern, is likely to lead to worse climatic conditions for health and production. Our 
findings suggest that, such worsening of climatic conditions could have very different 
effects on developed and developing countries. Developed economies with 
sufficiently high level of income can largely shield themselves from such adverse 
effect of climate change, while developing countries whose health and economic 
activities are still vulnerable to harsh climatic conditions are likely to bear the largest 
burdens. Moreover, the initial health status is an important in determining how fast a 
population can adapt to a changing climate. Countries that are burdened with diseases 
and disability will be affected by climate change more than otherwise would be 
(Confalonieri et al. 2007: 406). This means that further deterioration of climatic 
conditions would result in the poorest countries sinking deeper into the climate trap 
with little future prospect in finding their way out.  
 
The ability for humankind to adapt to climate change is a crucial element in 
determining the knock-on effect of global warming on health and development. The 
moderating effect of income on climate, as identified in our empirical analysis,   23
highlights the great adaptability of humankind to climate-related health hazards. But 
adaptability does not come automatically; skill and knowledge, awareness, resources 
and policy are important elements in creating this adaptability. For countries that are 
currently outside but close to the rim of a virtuous/vicious cycle, policies could play a 
big role as they may tip the balance of the natural effects of climate on health and 
production, and set the course of long term development in one way or the other. By 
knowing the distribution of countries based on the climatic effects on health and 
production, we can identify (mostly developing) countries that are at the risk of falling 
into a vicious cycle. This is the first step in developing informed adaptive strategies to 
alleviate the health risks of climate change. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the 
impact of climate on health and production are not necessarily correlated. With 
limited resources, it raises an issue of what specific intervention, or what combination 
of interventions on health and production will be most cost efficient in promoting 
development. For example, countries which have good climates for productivity but 
bad climates for health may benefit in particular from health interventions which 
offset the impact of climate on health rather than interventions to increase 
productivity. 
 
Technology is yet another important factor in moderating climate-induced health and 
production hazards. However, technologies in crucial areas, especially health and 
agriculture, are ecologically specific and therefore cannot be easily shared between 
countries with different ecological environment (Sachs 2001; Gollin, Parente & 
Rogerson 2002). This implies that technological advancement in rich countries, which 
mostly locates in temperate and coastal zones, do not necessarily benefit poor 
countries in tropical and landlocked areas. A corollary is that the mortality gap   24
between rich and poor will be further enlarged if there is no deliberate, international 
effort to put resources into developing technology suitable for the poor countries’ 
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Note: The solid lines inside the figure indicate respectively the mean values of the two 
indexes; the shade indicates the bands of mean ± 0.5standard deviation. 
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Table 1 Regression results of models 1-3 for the full, non-African, and African samples 
 
  Full sample (no. of obs. = 152)  Non-African sample (no. of obs. = 113)  African sample (no. of obs. = 39) 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 1NA    Model 2NA    Model 3NA  Model 1A    Model 2A    Model 3A   
CONSTANT  72.162 ***  -2.529   12.760 **  84.326 ***  21.168 *** 26.155 ***  82.076 ***  3.079   54.910 *** 
  (3.554)   (3.928)   (5.900)   (3.086)   (3.001)   (5.986)   (16.214)   (12.195)   (17.943)  
DNEW_POP  -0.010 ***     -0.003   -0.006 ***     -0.002   0.005       0.008  
  (0.002)       (0.002)   (0.002)       (0.001)   (0.005)       (0.006)  
EMEAN_POP  -9.665 ***     -6.292 ***  -2.714       0.504   -14.785 ***     -15.546 *** 
  (2.696)       (2.449)   (1.746)       (1.197)   (3.704)       (4.394)  
ROUGH_POP  5.508 *      6.943 ***  -0.190       1.946   9.905 **      9.629 *** 
  (3.047)       (2.201)   (5.146)       (3.280)   (4.519)       (3.590)  
ESD_POP  25.672 ***     21.340 ***  1.005       -0.258   -4.665       31.389  
  (5.538)       (5.185)   (4.611)       (3.095)   (30.867)       (39.083)  
LANDLOCKED  -3.625       -4.415 **  -0.835       -1.297   -11.987 ***     -12.151 *** 
  (2.373)       (2.016)   (1.747)       (1.011)   (2.400)       (3.322)  
TEMPAV_POP  -0.347 ***     -0.073   -0.393 ***     -0.154 ***  -1.128 **      -0.904 * 
  (0.101)       (0.074)   (0.081)       (0.057)   (0.504)       (0.504)  
TEMPSD_POP  1.141 ***     1.010 ***  -0.338       0.013   1.607 *      1.150  
  (0.283)       (0.231)   (0.310)       (0.193)   (0.916)       (0.927)  
PRECAV_POP  0.052 ***     0.031 **  -0.005       -0.001   0.056       0.028  
  (0.018)       (0.014)   (0.015)       (0.011)   (0.034)       (0.031)  
PRECSD_POP  -0.096 ***     -0.025   -0.040 **      0.012   -0.065 *      -0.033  
  (0.022)       (0.019)   (0.019)       (0.013)   (0.033)       (0.031)  
LGDP      8.105 ***  5.896 ***     5.645 ***  5.313 ***     6.573   2.899 * 
      (0.431)   (0.575)       (0.325)   (0.476)       (1.708)   (1.459)  
                              
R-squared  0.651   0.639   0.800   0.482   0.764   0.802   0.847   0.297   0.875  
Adjusted  R-squared  0.629   0.637   0.786   0.437   0.762   0.783   0.800   0.278   0.830  
                            
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote being significant at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 2 Regression results of models 4-6 for non-African and African samples 
  Non-African sample (no. of obs. = 113)  African sample (no. of obs. = 39) 
  Model 4NA    Model 5NA    Model 6NA    Model 5A    Model 6A   
CONSTANT  15.820   11.410   9.371   11.317   35.876  
  (30.558)   (8.386)   (6.891)   (27.934)   (24.803)  
DNEW_POP  0.012   0.024 ***  0.008   -0.002   0.004  
  (0.014)   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.009)   (0.041)  
EMEAN_POP  4.446   -0.113   6.004   14.238   23.633  
  (11.484)   (5.901)   (6.049)   (8.892)   (16.093)  
ROUGH_POP  -42.395   -11.159   -28.920   -11.363   -47.695 ** 
  (46.044)   (16.268)   (20.861)   (7.674)   (22.006)  
ESD_POP  14.287   -17.970   -1.130   -23.372   -141.991  
  (30.076)   (14.085)   (22.338)   (43.861)   (121.637)  
LANDLOCKED  -10.655   -2.136   -2.741   14.234   53.000 ** 
  (8.015)   (3.178)   (3.412)   (10.186)   (21.007)  
TEMPAV_POP  0.222   0.647 ***  0.351*   0.640   -1.017  
  (0.816)   (0.226)   (0.186)   (0.806)   (0.985)  
TEMPSD_POP  2.752   0.478   1.102   -1.519   -7.236 ** 
  (2.484)   (0.697)   (0.808)   (1.505)   (3.597)  
PRECAV_POP  0.013   0.024   0.008   -0.029   0.011  
  (0.118)   (0.055)   (0.030)   (0.031)   (0.168)  
PRECSD_POP  -0.160   -0.181 *  -0.098   0.042   -0.212  
  (0.143)   (0.099)   (0.075)   (0.042)   (0.460)  
LGDP  6.445 **  6.888 ***  7.063 ***  7.339   0.885  
  (3.197)   (1.053)   (0.830)   (5.595)   (4.508)  
DNEW_POP*LGDP  -0.002                 
  (0.002)                 
EMEAN_POP*LGDP  -0.483                 
  (1.329)                 
ROUGH_POP*LGDP  4.909                 
  (5.145)                 
ESD_POP*LGDP  -1.420                 
  (3.427)                 
LANDLOCKED*LGDP 1.151                 
  (0.853)                 
TEMPAV_POP*LGDP  -0.040                 
  (0.085)                 
TEMPSD_POP*LGDP  -0.304                 
  (0.265)                 
PRECAV_POP*LGDP  -0.001                 
  (0.013)                 
PRECSD_POP*LGDP 0.021                 
  (0.017)                 
CLIMATE*LGDP      -0.130 ***     -0.235 ***    
     (0.003)       (0.071)       
CLIMATE*LGDP_FITTED        -0.123  ***      -0.156  *** 
        (0.005)        (0.010)   
CLIMATE*LGDP_RESIDUE        -0.275  ***      -0.054   
        (0.101)        (0.037)   
                  
R-squared  0.845   0.812   0.826   0.899   0.906  
Adjusted  R-squared  0.813   0.791   0.805   0.858   0.862  
                  
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, **, * denote being significant at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3 Countries of Four Categories of Climatic Conditions 
  Good for health, good for production    Bad for health, good for production    Good for health, bad for production    Bad for health, bad for production 
  Algeria (LM)
1    Antigua and Barbuda (H)    Afghanistan (L)    Bhutan (LM) 
  Bahrain (H)    Barbados (H)    Armenia (LM)    Bolivia (LM) 
  Bulgaria (UM)    Cuba (LM)    China (LM)    Burundi (L) 
  Croatia (UM)    Czech Republic (H)    Georgia (LM)    Central African Republic (L) 
  Estonia (H)    Gambia (L)    Iran (LM)    Chad (L) 
  Finland (H)    Iceland (H)    Kazakhstan (UM)    Chile (UM) 
  Germany (H)    Ireland (H)    Kyrgyzstan (L)    Comoros (L) 
  Greece (H)    Luxembourg (H)    Micronesia (LM)    Costa Rica (UM) 
  Italy (H)    Saint Kitts and Nevis    Mongolia (L)    Ecuador (LM) 
  Kuwait (H)    Senegal (L)    Pakistan (L)    Ethiopia (L) 
  Latvia (UM)    Somalia (L)    Russia (UM)    Guatemala (LM) 
  Lithuania (UM)    Swaziland (LM)    Sudan (L)    Myanmar (L) 
  Oman (UM)    Switzerland (H)    Tajikistan (L)    Nepal (L) 
  Poland (UM)      Turkmenistan (LM)    Niger (L) 
  Qatar (H)      Uzbekistan (L)    Rwanda (L) 
  South Korea (H)        Uganda (L) 
  Moldova (LM)        Zambia (L) 
  Tunisia (LM)       
  Ukraine (LM)       
  United Arab Emirates (H)       
 
(1). World Bank income level classification: L = low; LM = lower-middle; UM = upper-middle; H = high. 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
The mortality data are sourced from the year 2000 national life tables published by the 
World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO life tables provide information on the 
mortality rates of 22 age groups for both sexes. There are totally 191 country life 
tables. We exclude countries that are in war at or immediately prior to year 2000. The 
availability of the other data further restricts our samples to 152 or less, depending on 
the specifications. Data for climate are sourced from Geographically based Economic 
Data (GEcon 1.3) project developed by William Nordhaus at Yale University and 
colleagues. Data and detail documents are available at http://gecon.yale.edu/. We 
retain the same variable notations as in GEcon 1.3; however, we adjusted the variables 
by population distribution within each country using the population data (POP90) in 
the dataset. Data for income per capita (PPP, constant 2000 international dollar) are 
sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Data for HIV 
prevalence data are sourced from the WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS). 
Tables A1 and A2 provide the summary statistics and correlation coefficients of the 
non-dummy variables. 
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Table A1 Summary statistics of non-dummy variables 
 
Full sample (152 obs.)  LE  LGDPDNEW_POPEMEAN_POPESD_POPROUGH_POPTEMPAV_POPTEMPSD_POPPRECAV_POPPRECSD_POP 
 Mean  66.17  8.48 254.33 0.48 0.08 0.23 18.42 4.42 97.38 54.27 
 Median  69.20  8.53 112.71 0.31 0.03 0.17 20.89 3.80 81.77 39.79 
 Maximum  81.30 10.55 1986.44 2.31 0.77 1.43 28.72 14.12 379.33 195.24 
 Minimum  36.60  6.21 4.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.25 0.20 3.88 4.24 
 Std. Dev.  10.77  1.06 364.60 0.46 0.14 0.22 7.75 3.27 63.94 40.90 
    
Non-African sample (113 obs.)                    
 Mean  70.79  8.79 238.16 0.46 0.10 0.23 16.69 5.07 98.12 47.15 
 Median  70.70  8.70 85.46 0.30 0.03 0.19 16.37 5.52 80.42 31.93 
 Maximum  81.30 10.55 1986.44 2.31 0.77 0.69 27.29 14.12 379.33 178.26 
 Minimum  53.00  6.61 4.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.25 0.20 6.70 7.43 
 Std. Dev.  6.09  0.94 389.27 0.47 0.16 0.18 8.01 3.45 66.51 38.31 
    
African sample (39 obs.)                     
 Mean  52.79  7.56 301.17 0.52 0.03 0.21 23.44 2.54 95.23 74.89 
 Median  51.60  7.48 180.57 0.38 0.01 0.10 23.96 2.03 86.85 77.37 
 Maximum  71.30  9.55 1037.12 1.97 0.13 1.43 28.72 6.67 208.82 195.24 
 Minimum  36.60  6.21 18.89 0.03 0.00 0.01 12.74 0.68 3.88 4.24 
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Table A2 Correlation coefficient of non-dummy variables 
 
Full sample (152 obs.)  LE  LGDPDNEW_POPEMEAN_POPESD_POPROUGH_POPTEMPAV_POPTEMPSD_POPPRECAV_POPPRECSD_POP 
LE 1                   
LGDP 0.80  1               
DNEW_POP -0.34  -0.33 1             
EMEAN_POP -0.26  -0.29 0.39 1           
ESD_POP 0.03  -0.16 0.23 0.71 1         
ROUGH_POP 0.09  -0.12 -0.06 0.43 0.50 1       
TEMPAV_POP -0.45  -0.45 -0.25 -0.21 -0.15 0.05 1   
TEMPSD_POP 0.33  0.30 0.45 0.10 0.02 -0.21 -0.79 1   
PRECAV_POP -0.04  -0.14 -0.33 -0.19 -0.03 0.28 0.46 -0.67 1 
PRECSD_POP -0.41  -0.49 -0.17 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.61 -0.64 0.67 1 
    
Non-African sample (113 obs.)                    
LE 1.00                   
LGDP 0.87  1.00               
DNEW_POP -0.36  -0.34 1.00             
EMEAN_POP -0.29  -0.40 0.40 1.00           
ESD_POP -0.26  -0.37 0.28 0.80 1.00         
ROUGH_POP -0.26  -0.38 0.05 0.66 0.69 1.00       
TEMPAV_POP -0.36  -0.31 -0.36 -0.19 -0.05 0.15 1.00   
TEMPSD_POP 0.15  0.14 0.55 0.12 -0.06 -0.27 -0.78 1.00   
PRECAV_POP -0.20  -0.22 -0.33 -0.19 -0.04 0.27 0.56 -0.74 1.00 
PRECSD_POP -0.40  -0.46 -0.21 -0.01 0.13 0.26 0.62 -0.62 0.69 1.00 
                    
African sample (39 obs.)                     
LE 1.00                   
LGDP 0.54  1.00               
DNEW_POP -0.66  -0.37 1.00               35
EMEAN_POP -0.43  0.05 0.33 1.00           
ESD_POP -0.01  0.03 -0.13 0.64 1.00         
ROUGH_POP 0.45  0.25 -0.32 0.05 0.22 1.00       
TEMPAV_POP -0.12  -0.42 0.17 -0.71 -0.69 -0.18 1.00   
TEMPSD_POP 0.13  0.30 0.13 0.20 0.15 -0.23 -0.53 1.00  
PRECAV_POP 0.14  0.02 -0.33 -0.18 -0.03 0.34 0.24 -0.73 1.00 
PRECSD_POP -0.17  -0.28 -0.17 -0.25 -0.21 -0.02 0.43 -0.68 0.77 1.00 
 